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Abstract
This article studies socially optimal allocations, in the first-best sense, in environments characterized by fixed
resources and endogenous fertility. Individuals in our environment are fully rational and altruistic toward their
descendants, the social planner is benevolent, and there is full information. Our model allows for rich
heterogeneity of abilities, preferences for children, and costs of raising children. We find that efficient
allocations in the endogenous fertility case differ significantly from its exogenous fertility counterpart. In
particular, optimal steady-state population is proportional to the amount of fixed resources and to the level of
technology while steady state individual consumption is independent of these variables, a sort of "Malthusian
stagnation" result. Furthermore, efficient allocations exhibit inequality, differ- ential fertility, random
consumption, and a higher population density of poorer individuals. We prove a version of the second welfare
theorem: efficient allocations can be decentralized through competitive markets and an initial distribution of
property rights over the fixed resources.
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Abstract
This article studies socially optimal allocations, in the rst-best sense, in environments
characterized by xed resources and endogenous fertility. Individuals in our environment are
fully rational and altruistic toward their descendants, the social planner is benevolent, and
there is full information. Our model allows for rich heterogeneity of abilities, preferences for
children, and costs of raising children. We nd that e¢ cient allocations in the endogenous
fertility case di¤er signicantly from its exogenous fertility counterpart. In particular, optimal
steady-state population is proportional to the amount of xed resources and to the level of
technology while steady state individual consumption is independent of these variables, a sort
of "Malthusian stagnation" result. Furthermore, e¢ cient allocations exhibit inequality, di¤er-
ential fertility, random consumption, and a higher population density of poorer individuals.
We prove a version of the second welfare theorem: e¢ cient allocations can be decentralized
through competitive markets and an initial distribution of property rights over the xed re-
sources.
Keywords: E¢ ciency, optimal population, endogenous fertility, stochastic abilities, inequality.
JEL Classication: D04, D10, D63, D64, D80, D91, E10, E60, I30, J13, N00, 011, 040, Q01.
1 Introduction
There is growing interest in understanding equilibrium and e¢ ciency properties of economies char-
acterized by endogenous fertility (e.g. Golosov et al. 2007, Conde-Ruiz et. al. 2010, Hosseini et.
al. 2013, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt 2014, Pérez-Nievas et. al. 2018). As this literature makes clear,
usual notions of e¢ ciency may not apply when population is endogenous. This article contributes
to this literature by studying in detail a case of major historical importance: the Malthusian case.
In particular, we investigate the properties of socially optimal allocations, in the rst-best sense,
in environments characterized by xed resources and endogenous fertility.
Malthusian models have recently gained renewing interest as part of a larger literature seeking
to provide a unied theory of economic growth, from prehistoric to modern times (e.g., Becker,
Murphy, and Tamura 1990, Jones 1999, Galor and Weil 2000, Lucas 2002, Hansen and Prescott
Early version circulated under the title Malthusian Stagnation is E¢ cient.
yDepartment of Economics, Iowa State University, 279 Heady Hall, Ames IA 50010, e-mail:
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ingliu@whu.edu.cn.
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2002, Doepke 2004). The focus of this literature has been mostly positive rather than normative:
to describe mechanisms for the stagnation of living standards even in the presence of technological
progress. But the fundamental issue of e¢ ciency in Malthusian economies, which is key to formu-
lating policy recommendations and better understand the extent to which the "Malthusian trap"
could have been avoided, has received scarce attention. This paper seeks to ll this gap.
Our model economy is populated by a large number of nitely-lived fully rational individuals
who are altruistic toward their descendants. Individuals are of di¤erent types and a type determines
characteristics such as labor skills, the rate of time preference, and the ability to raise children.
Types are stochastic and determined at birth. We formulate the problem faced by a benevolent
social planner who cares about the welfare of all potential individuals, present and future. The
planner directly allocates consumption and number of children to individuals in all generations and
states subject to aggregate resource constraints, promise-keeping constraints, population dynamics,
and a xed amount of natural resources. For short, we call "land" the xed resource. The economy
is closed, there is no capital accumulation nor migration. Furthermore, there is neither underlying
frictions, such as private information or moral hazard, so that the focus is on rst-best allocations.
The rich structure of the model allows us to study questions of aggregate e¢ ciency as well as
distributional issues such as optimal inequality, social mobility and social classes. Distributional
considerations can be particularly challenging. Lucas (2002) has shown that inequality could be
hard to sustain as an equilibrium result in Malthusian economies. We show that inequality arises
naturally in our environment.
The following are the main ndings. First, we show that stagnation of the Malthusian type
is e¢ cient. Specically, steady-state consumption is independent of the amount of land, and
under general conditions, the level of technology. As a result, land discoveries, such as the ones
discussed by Malthus, lead to more steady-state population but no additional consumption. A
similar prediction holds true for technological advancements as long as the production function is
Cobb-Douglas or technological progress is of land-augmenting, the type of progress that is more
needed because land is the limiting factor.
The source of the stagnation is a well-known prediction of endogenous fertility models, according
to which optimal consumption is proportional to the net costs of raising a child. For example,
Becker and Barro nd that "when people are more costly to produce, it is optimal to endow each
person produced with a higher level of consumption. In e¤ect, it pays to raise the utilization rate
(in the sense of a higher c) when costs of production of descendants are greater (Becker and Barro,
1988, pg. 10)." We show that this link between optimal consumption and the net cost of raising
children also holds for a benevolent planner and under more general conditions. The crux of the
proof of stagnation is to show that neither land discoveries, nor technological progress, alter the
steady-state net cost of raising a child, and in particular the marginal product of labor, which is
needed to value both the parental time costs of children and childrens marginal output.
Second, we show that e¢ cient allocations exhibit social classes. Only types with the highest
rate of time preference have positive population shares and consumption shares in steady state.
Furthermore, unlike the exogenous fertility case, it is generally not e¢ cient to equalize consump-
tion among types, even if their Pareto weights are identical, nor to eliminate consumption risk.
E¢ cient consumption is stochastic even in the absence of aggregate risk. These results are further
implications of consumption being a function of the net cost of raising children. In an e¢ cient
allocation, poor individuals are the ones with the lowest net costs of raising children.1
Third, there is an inverse relationship between consumption and population size: the lower the
1Córdoba and Liu (2014, 2016) and Cordoba, Liu and Ripoll (2016) provide further characterizations of models
with endogenous fertility and idiosyncractic risk.
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consumption of a type the larger its population share. It is e¢ cient to let individuals with lower
net costs of having children to reproduce more; but it is also optimal to endow their children with
lower consumption, one that is proportional to those net costs. As a result, there are more poor
individuals than rich individuals in an e¢ cient allocation. Furthermore, population di¤erences
among types are larger than their corresponding consumption di¤erences. The factor controlling
the di¤erences depends positively on the elasticity of parental altruism to the number of children,
and negatively on the intergenerational elasticity of substitution.2
Fourth, fertility di¤ers among types. Optimal fertility depends on parental types but also on
grandparent types. Given grandparent types, parents with low consumption have more children
than parents with high consumption. Given parent types, consumption rich grandparents have
more grandchildren than consumption poor grandparents.
Fifth, steady-state allocations, and in particular the land-labor ratio, generally depends on
initial conditions. The e¢ cient steady state depends on the initial distribution of population and
on Pareto weights. This is unlike the neoclassical growth model in which the e¢ cient capital-labor
ratio, or modied golden rule level of capital, is independent of initial conditions and Pareto weights.
Malthusian economies thus do not exhibit a clear separation between e¢ ciency and distribution.
At the light of these results, e¢ cient allocations could rationalize three key aspects of Malthu-
sian economies: (i) stagnation of individual consumption in the presence of technological progress
and/or improvements in the availability of land; (2) social classes, inequality, and widespread
poverty; (3) di¤erential fertilities. These results could also help explain why the so-called Malthu-
sian trap was so pervasive in pre-industrial societies. Even in the best case scenario of an economy
populated by loving rational parents, and governed by an all-powerful benevolent rational planner,
stagnation could still naturally arise, as well as social classes and di¤erential fertility. Our results
also suggest that is not irrational animal spirits, as suggested by Malthus, which ultimately ex-
plains the stagnation. Stagnation can be the result of a social optimal choice between the quality
and quantity of life in the presence of limited natural resources.
Our paper is related to Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007) who have shown that population is
e¢ cient in dynastic altruistic models of endogenous fertility and xed land of the Barro-Becker
type. They do not derive results about stagnation, the distribution of consumption and population,
nor di¤erential fertility. Moreover, they elaborate on the Pareto concept of e¢ ciency while we study
e¢ ciency from the point of view of utilitarian social planners. We discuss the connection between
the two concepts using our framework.
Lucas (2002) studies equilibrium in Malthusian economies populated by altruistic fully rational
parents. His focus is on simple representative economies where fertility is equal across groups,
in steady state. He shows that stagnation arises under certain conditions. Lucas discusses the
di¢ culties in generating social classes. He is able to generate classes by assuming heterogeneity
in the degree of time preference and binding saving constraints. As a result, the equilibrium
with social classes is not e¢ cient in his model. We are able to generate e¢ cient social classes
and di¤erential fertility by allowing individuals to di¤er in their labor skills and costs of raising
children.
Our paper also relates to Dasgupta (2005) who studies the optimal population in an endowment
economy with xed resources. He does not consider the cost of raising children and focuses on the
special case of generation-relative utilitarianism. Our model is richer in production, altruism, and
the technology of raising children. Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1986) show that the population in the
competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient under two possible externalities. First, a larger population helps
2The intergenerational elasticity of substitution is analogous to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution but
applied to di¤erent generations rather than di¤erent periods. See Cordoba and Ripoll (2018).
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to provide more public goods such as national defense. Second, larger population reduces wage
rate if there is a xed amount of land. Eckstein, Stern, and Wolpin (1988) show that population
can stabilize and non-subsistence consumption arises in the equilibrium when fertility choices are
endogenously introduced into a model with a xed amount of land. Parents exhibit warm glow
altruism while our paper builds on pure altruism. De la Croix (2012) studies sustainable population
by proposing non-cooperative bargaining between clans living on an island with limited resources.
Children in his model act like an investment good for parentsold-age support.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the general stochastic model.
Section 3 studies the deterministic representative agent version of the general model and derives
the main stagnation results. Section 4 considers deterministic heterogeneity and derives key results
regarding the distribution of population and consumption across types, as well as the importance
of initial conditions for the steady state. Section 5 studies the full stochastic model and derives
the key result for di¤erential fertility, consumption, and population. Section 6 concludes. Proofs
are provided in the Appendix.
2 Motivating case: Barro-Becker with Fixed Resources
This section derives a set of baseline results that arise when fertility is endogenous and some
essential factors of production are in xed supply. In particular, we consider equilibrium allocations
in an agricultural society populated by Barro-Becker families who have access to a Cobb-Duglass
technology in land and labor.3 Land should be understood more generally as to include all resources
in xed supply. Golosov et. al. (2007) have shown that the equilibrium of such an economy is
A e¢ cient and P e¢ cient.4 They did not explore other properties of the equilibrium allocations.
We highlight three qualitative di¤erences between the endogenous and the exogenous fertility
versions of the model. First, steady-state individual consumption is una¤ected by technological
progress or discovery of new resources when fertility is endogenous while it fully responds when
fertility is exogenous. Second, steady-state population fully responds to technological progress
or discoveries of new resources when fertility is endogenous while, by assumption, population is
una¤ected in the exogenous fertility case. Third, any initial inequality in land holdings vanishes
when population is endogenous while it perpetuates when population is exogenous. The rst two
predictions of the model are consistent with stylized facts of the Malthusian era, as described
for example by Ashraf and Galor (2011), while the third is not. The next section signicantly
generalizes the benchmark model of this section by considering social optima, rather competitive
equilibria, under more general preferences, technologies, heterogeneity, stochastic components, and
social mobility.
Households. The economy under consideration has a mass 1 of agents at time 0. Let i 2 [0; 1]
denotes an individual in the beginning of time, who is also the head of dynasty i. Individuals are
initially endowed with ki0 ( 0) units of land. The aggregate amount of land is xed and given by
K =
R 1
0
ki0di: Time is discrete: t = 0; 1; 2; ::: .
Individuals live for two periods, one as children and one as adults. Children do not consume.
A time t adult from dynasty i consumes cit and has nit children. Let rt be the rental rate of
land and qt be its price. There are three costs of raising a child: a goods cost  units per-child, a
time cost  units of labor per child, and the cost of providing kit+1 units of land per child, qtkit+1.
Adults are subject to a budget constraint of the form:
cit + ( + qtkit+1)nit  wt (1  nit) + (rt + qt) kit for t  0;
3Dynastic preferences are modelled as in Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989).
4We discuss these concepts in Section 3.
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where wt is the wage rate and 1  nit is the labor supply.
Parents are assumed to be altruistic toward their children. In particular, the lifetime utility
of a time t adult, Uit; takes the following recursive time-additive form due to Barro and Becker
(1989) and Becker and Barro (1988):
Uit =
cit

+ n itUit+1;  2 (0; 1) and  2 (; 1) : (1)
Let Nit be the size of dynasty i at time t and Nt =
R 1
0
Nitdi be the total population at time t. Nit
is dened as
Nit =
t 1Y
s=0
nis for i 2 [0; 1] and t = 1; 2; ::: : (2)
The dynastic problem can then be described as
max
fcit;kit+1;Nit+1g1t=0;
1X
t=0
tN itu (cit) (3)
subject to
ci;t + ( + wt+ qtkit+1)
Nit+1
Nit
 wt + (rt + qt) kit for t  0; (4)
given ki0 > 0: The objective function in (3) is obtained from (1) by recursively eliminating Uit+s
for s > 0 and imposing standard boundedness conditions. The budget constraint uses the result
that nit =
Nit+1
Nit
:
Firms. Firms produce using the Cobb-Douglas technology F (K;L;A) = AKL1 ; which is
constant returns in land, K, and labor, L. Parameter A refers to the state of technology. Firms
hire labor and rent capital in competitive labor markets.
Resource constraints. The following are the resource constraints of the economy, for t  0:Z 1
0
Nitkitdi  K;
Lt 
Z 1
0
Nit (1  nit) di; andZ 1
0
Nitcitdi+ 
Z 1
0
Nit+1di  F (Kt; Lt; A) : (5)
The rst equation states that total individual holdings of land are no larger than the total amount
of land available. Assuming that each individual has one unit of labor endowment, the second
equation states that labor supply equals total population minus the time cost of raising children.
The last equation states that total consumption is no larger than total production.
The following denition of competitive equilibrium is standard.
Denition of equilibrium: Given an initial distribution of land and population, fki0; Ni0gi2[0;1]
; a competitive equilibrium are sequences of prices, fqt; rt; wtg1t=0 and allocations

cit; n

it; k

it+1; N

it+1
	1
t=0;i2[0;1]
such that (i) given prices, the allocations solve the dynastic problem; (ii) land, labor, and good
markets clear.
Equilibrium: Let Rt+1  rt+1+qt+1qt be the gross return. The following four equations charac-
terize the determination of land returns, consumption, fertility and wages for t > 0:5
cit
cit+1
 1
=  (nit)
  1
Rt+1 =  (n

t )
  1
Rt+1 for t  0 and i 2 [0; 1] ; (6)
cit+1 = c

t+1 =

    [Rt+1 ( + wt)  wt+1] for t > 0 and i 2 [0; 1] ; (7)
5Section 7 provides the solution to a generalized version of this model.
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cit = A

K
Lt

(1  nit)  nit for t  0; (8)
wt = (1  )A

K
Lt

for t  0: (9)
The rst equation is an intergenerational version of the Euler Equation with the special feature that
the discount factor, n  1it ; depends on the number of children. The second equation is derived by
combining rst-order conditions for fertility and land holdings plus the budget constraint. It states
that consumption is equal for all individuals after period 0 and proportional to the net future value
costs of raising a child: Rt+1 ( + wt)   wt+1. Becker and Barro (1988) rst derived this result
for a representative agent economy while Bosi et al (2011) extended it to an heterogeneous agent
economy. Becker and Barro describe this fundamental nding as follows: "When people are more
costly to produce, it is optimal to endow each person produced with a higher level of consumption.
In e¤ect, it pays to raise the utilization rate(in the sense of a higher ci) when costs of production
of descendants are greater." (Barro and Becker, 1989, pg. 484).
Equation (8) is the resource constraint in per-capita terms while Equation (9) denes equilib-
rium wages. Plugging (6) into (7), it follows that fertility is the same for all dynasties, that is
nit = nt for all t > 0: Thus, initial di¤erences in land holding among individuals do not persist
through di¤erences in consumption or fertility of their descendants. Instead, they persist through
di¤erences in population sizes, Nit: This is in contrast with the exogenous population version of the
model in which any initial inequality in land holdings would translate into persistent consumption
di¤erences.6
Steady state. For concreteness we now focus on steady state solutions of the type ct = c
,
nt = n
; Nit = N

i , N
 = N, L = (1  )N; wt = w = FL (K;L;A) and Rt = R. A steady
state population requires fertility, n, to be 1. In that case, (6) reduces to the standard gross
return determination, R = 1; while equations (7)-(9) can be written as the following system of
two equations in two unknowns, c and w:
c =

    [= + (=   1)w
] ; and (10)
w =
1  
1   (c
 + ) : (11)
Surprisingly, neither A nor K appear in this system. Consequently, steady-state consumption and
wages are independent of the technological level, A, or the xed amount of resources, K; when
fertility is endogenous. In contrast, both consumption and wages increase with A and K when
fertility is exogenous (see Footnote 6).
Substituting (11) into (10) and solving for c results in:
c = c


+
; 
+
; 
 
;  
 
; 
+

=
1=   (1  =) 1 1 
  
 + (1  =) 1 1 
: (12)
According to this equation, consumption is a positive function of the goods and time costs of
raising children. Use equations (9) into (11) to nd the following solution for population:
N = N

A
+
;K
+
; 
 
;  ; +
;  
+
; 
 

=
"
(1  )1 A
c (; ; ;  ; ) + 
#1=
K: (13)
Steady-state population responds negatively to consumption, and its determinants, but in addition,
it increases with technology and resource availability.
6 If n = 1 is imposed then the equilibrium would satisfy kit = ki0; cit = ci = w (1  ) + rki0   ; w =
FL (K; (1  )N ;A) and r = FK (K; (1  )N ;A) for all t  0.
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Next, we investigate the extent to which the predictions of the canonical model of this section
are robust to various generalizations. A natural reaction to the above results is that they are just
a special case that arises due to the combination of power utility, power altruism, and a Cobb-
Douglas technology. Moreover, if the stagnation results could be overturned then the prediction of
an equalitarian society may not follow.
3 Socially E¢ cient Allocations
This section considers social optima for more general specications of preferences, technologies, and
rich heterogeneity in earning abilities, ability to raise children and altruism toward children, as
well as stochastic intergenerational transmission of abilities and altruism. We focus on planners
solutions rather than market equilibria for at least two reasons. First, characterizing rst-best
allocations is of interest on its own. One may suspect, for example, that some of the baseline
results, such as consumption not responding to technological progress, may be due to some type
of market failure. Second, planners solutions are often simpler to obtain than market solutions
particularly when fertility is endogenous and parents are fully altruistic. In this case, Barro-
Becker preferences provide a tractable benchmark but little is known for more general altruistic
preferences. A contribution of the paper is to provide a methodology to study Pareto allocations
when fertility is endogenous. Section 4 addresses issues of descentralization. Issues of stability are
discussed in the Appendix.
We nd that the rst two features of the equilibrium solution are generally also properties of the
planners solution: consumption remains unresponsive to discoveries of new natural resources or
to technological progress in the Cobb-Douglas case, or to land-augmenting technological progress
for a more general formulation of the production function. Long-run equality, however, is not a
robust feature. We are able to generate long-run inequality and social mobility in the stochastic
version of the model. In this regard, our approach is very di¤erent from Lucas (2002). He is able
to generate two social classes, with no possibility of social mobility, by assuming that the rate of
time discount is a non-monotonic function of consumption. This non-standard feature is violated,
for example, by the Barro-Becker model. We instead rely on stochastic types which result, even in
the full information case, in inequality and social mobility.
3.1 Resource constraints
The production technology is described by the function F (K;L;A) where K is a xed amount
of land, L is labor, and A is a technological parameter. Suppose F is constant returns to scale
in K and L. Let 
 
K
L ; A
  FK(K;L;A)KF (K;L;A) denote the land share of output. As in section 2, the
economy is populated by large numbers of dynastic altruistic individuals who live for two periods,
one as a child and one as an adult. Children do not consume. Individuals are heterogeneous
in terms of labor skills, rates of time preference, and ability to raise children. In particular,
individuals draw a random signal, or type, ! 2 
  f!1; !2; :::; !Kg; upon birth which denes
his or her type. Given parental signal !t, childs signals !t+1 are drawn from the Markov chain
(!0; !) = Pr(!t+1 = !0j!t = !). Assume  is irreducible. Let !t = [!0; !1; :::; !t] 2 
t+1
represents a particular family history of signals up to time t while ct (!t) and nt (!t) denote
consumption and fertility of an individual with that family history. E¤ective labor supply, l (!) ;
degree of altruism, (n; !); and the goods and time costs of raising a child,  (!) and  (!) ; are
then functions of an individuals type.
Let Nt (!t) be the population with history !t and Nt 
P
!t Nt (!
t) be total population at
7
time t: Initial levels of population of each type, N0 (!i), !i 2 
; are given. Assuming a law of large
numbers, population with history !t+1 2 
t+2 obeys the following law of motion:
Nt+1
 
!t+1

= Nt
 
!t

nt
 
!t

 (!t+1; !t) for t  0: (14)
Fertility rates are assumed to be subject to a biological maximum of n. The potential population at
history !t+1 is therefore N t+1
 
!t+1

= N t (!
t)n (!t+1; !t) with N0
 
!0

= N0 (!0) : Aggregate
labor supply satises
Lt =
X
!t
Nt
 
!t

l (!t)

1  t (!t)nt
 
!t

for t  0; (15)
where l (!t) [1  t (!t)nt (!t)] is e¤ective individual labor supply of a particular type once time
costs of raising children and individuals ability are taken into account. Finally, aggregate resource
constraints are given by
F (K;Lt;A) =
X
!t
Nt
 
!t
 
ct
 
!t

+  (!t)nt
 
!t

for t  0: (16)
3.2 Individual welfare
Parents are assumed to be altruistic toward their children. The lifetime utility of an individual
born at time t  0; history !t; Ut (!t) ; is of the expected-utility form:
Ut
 
!t

= u
 
ct
 
!t

+ 
 
nt
 
!t

; !

E

Ut+1
 
!t+1
 j!t (17)
+
 
 (n; !)    nt  !t ; !U;
where u () is the utility ow from consumption,  (; !)7 is the weight that a parent of type !
attaches to the welfare of her n born children,  (n; !)    (n; !) is the weight attached to the
unborn children, E

Ut+1
 
!t+1
 j!t is the expected utility of a born child conditional on parental
history and U is the utility of an unborn child as perceived by the parent. Function u satises
u0 > 0 and u00 < 0: The population ethics literature refers to U as the "neutral" utility level, a
level above which a life is worth living (Blackorby et al. 2005, pg. 25).
Equation (17) describes parents as social planners at the family level. This is particularly clear
in the special case  (n; !) = n. The more general function  (; !) allows for exible weights and
time discounting. While  (n; !) is the total weight of the n born children, n (n; !) is the marginal
weight assigned to the n child where n 2 [0; n]. We assume n (n; ; !) > 0 and nn (n; !)  0
so that parents are altruistic toward each child and marginal altruism is non-increasing. These
preferences are discussed in Cordoba and Ripoll (2011) who show that (17) satises a fundamental
axiom of altruism. Specically, parental utility increases with the number of born children if and
only if children are better o¤ born than unborn in expected value, that is, E

Ut+1
 
!t+1
 j!t > U:
Let  (!)   (1; !) be the discount factor,  (c)  u0(c)cu(c) be the elasticity of the utility ow
and  (n; !)  0(n;!)n(n;!) be the elasticity of the altruistic function. Barro-Becker preferences are an
special case obtained when u(c) = c

 ,  (n; !) = n
 ; U = 0;  2 (0; 1) and  2 (; 1) :
3.3 Social Welfare
The planner is envisioned as the ultimate parent, someone who cares about the welfare of all
potential individuals in the society. Consistent with (17), it is natural to consider a social welfare
function that takes the following generalized total utilitarian form:
1X
t=0
t
"X
!t
	
 
Nt
 
!t

Ut
 
!t

+
 X
!t
	
 
N t
 
!t
 X
!t
	
 
Nt
 
!t
!
U
#
: (18)
7 In the rest of this paper we sometimes omit the second argument for succinct writing.
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The parameter 0 <  < 1 reects time discounting while the function 	 (Nt (!t)) ; satisfying
	0 ()  0 and 	00 ()  0, is the weight that the social planner puts on group Nt (!t). The special
case 	 (Nt (!t)) = Nt (!t) describes a classical total utilitarian planner while 	 (Nt (!t)) = 1
describes an Millian average utilitarian. The function 	 (N) = N p is the natural counterpart of
Barro-Beckers altruism but applied to the planner. Denote by  P (N) =
	0(N)N
	(N) the elasticity of
function 	:
The case  = 0 is dened as X
!
	 (N0 (!))U0 (!) :
It refers to a planner who cares only about the initial generation but also future generations to the
extent that the initial generation does. In this case social discounting equals private discounting
and the problem becomes one of dynastic maximization.  > 0 refers to a planner who is more
patient than individuals, as in Farhi and Werning (2007).
Our social welfare function does not allow for arbitrary Pareto weights, and thus we do not
trace the full Pareto frontier. However, the function is tractable and includes the key relevant
cases usually considered in the literature: classical utilitarianism and Mills utilitarianism. By
construction, the maximizing allocation will be Pareto e¢ cient, or P e¢ cient following Golosov
et al. (2007) terminology. In particular, the welfare of all potential individuals, born and unborn, is
explicitly considered by the planner. Golosov et al. (2007) emphasize a second e¢ ciency concept,
A e¢ ciency, which takes into account only the welfare of individuals born in all feasible allocations.
As shown recently by Pérez-Nievas et al. (forthcoming), A e¢ ciency is equivalent to dynastic
maximization, which in our our model corresponds to the case  = 0, if potential people are
identied by the date they may be born rather than by a birth order rule, as assumed by Golosov
et. al. (2007). Since our model allows for   0; then both A e¢ ciency and P e¢ cient allocations
are characterized.
The welfare function (18) is a version of NGs (1986) number-dampened total utility generalized
to include multiple periods and time discounting. The standard reasoning for considering number
dampening, or alternative social criteria such as the "critical-level utilitarianism" of Blackorby and
Donalson (1984), is to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. An allocation is "repugnant" when it
entails maximum population and minimum utility, or immiseration. The Repugnant Conclusion
does not apply in our environment, as shown below, because parental rights are explicitly considered
and children are costly to raise (Hammond 1988).
Although our main results hold for a standard total utilitarian, it is useful to consider the
number-dampening case for two reasons: (i) it is natural given that parents in our model exhibit
such behavior, of diminishing returns to family size; and (ii) it turns out to be important for time
consistency and uniqueness of the steady state.
The following assumption bounds the extent to which the planner cares about future genera-
tions.
Assumption 1.  < (!) for all !.
The role of Assumption 1 is tractability. The assumption is not particularly restrictive because
it still allows for the planner to care about future generations more than parents do. We leave the
more complicated case   (!) for the Appendix. We can now dene the planners problem.
Denition Given an initial distribution of population fN0 (!)g!2
 ; the planner chooses sequences
Ut (!
t) ; ct (!
t) ; nt (!
t) ; Nt+1
 
!t+1

; Lt
	
!t2
t+1;t0 to maximize social welfare (18) subject
to sequences of resource constraints (16), labor supply (15), laws of motions for population
(14) and individual welfare (17).
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We assume throughout that the planners problem is well dened, that the solution is unique,
and refer to its solution as the optimal or e¢ cient allocation. We also follow the standard practice
in population ethics of normalizing the utility level U to zero (e.g., Blackorby et al. 2005, pg.
25). This means that, in the mind of parents and the planner, a life is worth living if and only if
Ut (!
t)  0: Since Ut can be written as a discounted sum of utility ows, we assume that u(c)  0.
For clarity, it is convenient to write the Lagrangian corresponding to the planners problem:
$ =
X
t=0
t
X
!t
	
 
Nt
 
!t

Ut
 
!t

+
1X
t=0
X
!t
t
 
!t

Nt
 
!t
 
u(ct
 
!t

) + 
 
nt
 
!t

; !

EtUt+1
 
!t+1
  Ut  !t
+
1X
t=0
X
!t+1
t+1
 
!t+1
 
Nt+1
 
!t+1
  nt  !t (!t+1; !t)Nt  !t
+
1X
t=0
t
"
F (K;Lt;A) 
X
!t
Nt
 
!t
 
ct
 
!t

+  (!t)nt
 
!t
#
+
1X
t=0
t
"X
!t
Nt
 
!t

l (!t)

1  t (!t)nt
 
!t
  Lt# ;
where

t (!
t) ; t+1
 
!t+1

; t; t
	
!t2
t+1;t0 are non-negative multipliers. We assume parame-
ter values are such that solutions are interior.8 The rst restriction of the problem resembles a
promise keeping constraint while the remaining restrictions are resource constraints. The rst
order conditions with respect to fUt (!t) ; Nt+1
 
!t+1

; nt (!
t) ; ct (!
t) ; Ltg!t2
t+1;t0 are:9
0 (!0)N0 (!0) = 	 (N0 (!0)) ; (19)
t+1
 
!t+1

Nt+1
 
!t+1

= t+1	
 
Nt+1
 
!t+1

(20)
+t
 
!t

Nt
 
!t


 
nt
 
!t

; !

 (!t+1; !t) ;
t+1	0
 
Nt+1
 
!t+1

Ut+1
 
!t+1

(21)
+t+1l (!t+1)

1  t+1 (!t+1)nt+1
 
!t+1

+ t+1
 
!t+1

= t+1

ct+1
 
!t+1

+  (!t+1)nt+1
 
!t+1

+nt+1
 
!t+1
 X
!t+2j!t+1
t+2
 
!t+2


 
!t+2; !t+1

;
t
 
!t

n
 
nt
 
!t

; !

EtUt+1
 
!t+1

(22)
= t (!t) + tl (!t)t (!t) +
X
!t+1j!t
t+1
 
!t+1


 
!t+1; !t

;
t
 
!t

u0(ct
 
!t

) = t; (23)
tFLt = t: (24)
where
FL;t =

1  

K
Lt
; A

F (K;Lt;A)
Lt
(25)
This system of equations together with (14), (15), (16), (17) and proper transversality conditions
fully describe interior e¢ cient allocations. Equation (19) states that the initial social value of
8For example, the Barro-Becker model possesses an interior solution under certain parameter restrictions.
9To avoid cumbersome notation, we do not introduce new notation to identify optimal allocations. Allocations
from now on should be regarded as optimal.
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providing utility to a particular group, 0 (!0)N0 (!0) ; depends on the exogenous Pareto weight
of group N0 (!0). Equation (20) then allows us to trace the evolution of this value. The right hand
side of the equation is the marginal benet of promising utility Ut+1
 
!t+1

while the left hand side
is its marginal cost. Notice that if the Markov chain  is irreducible, the planner eventually assigns
social value, and therefore provides utility, to individuals of all types just because all dynasties
eventually have descendants of every type. This would not be the case if  is reducible.
Equation (21) equates marginal benets to marginal costs of having people. To better under-
stand this expression, assume for a moment that population is not constrained by (14), for example,
because the planner have access to an innite pool of immigrants. In that case t+1
 
!t+1

= 0 for
all t and !t+1: In other words,  is the value of an immigrant. The marginal benet of an additional
individual of type !t+1 includes her direct e¤ect in social welfare, t+1	0
 
Nt+1
 
!t+1

Ut+1 plus
her e¤ect in the labor supply, t+1l (!t+1)

1  t+1 (!t+1)nt+1
 
!t+1

; while the marginal cost
includes the costs of providing consumption and children to the individual, t+1[ct+1
 
!t+1

+
 (!t+1)nt+1
 
!t+1

]. Adding restriction (14) makes the individual more valuable in the amount
t+1
 
!t+1

because it relaxes the population constraint at t+ 1, but also increases marginal cost
because the planner needs to endow the individual with children at t+ 2:
The condition for optimal fertility is (22). The marginal benet of a child for an altruistic parent
with history !t is the expected utility of the child, EtUt+1; times the weight that the parent attaches
to the child, n (nt (!t) ; !) : The marginal benet for the planner is this amount times t (!t) : The
corresponding marginal cost of the child for the planner includes good costs, t (!t), time costs,
tl (!t) (!t), and the expected shadow costs of a descendant,
P
!t+1j!t t+1
 
!t+1


 
!t+1j!t.
To characterize the solution of this system we focus primarily on the steady state and proceed
in three steps. First, we characterize the deterministic case with only one type (Section 4), then the
case with multiple but deterministic types (Section 5) and nally the stationary solution with sto-
chastic types. We show that Malthusian stagnation generally arises when technological progress is
of the land-augmenting type meaning that steady-state optimal consumption and fertility choices
are independent of K and A. We also characterize the optimal composition of population, the
potential dependence of the steady-state land-labor ratio on initial conditions, and fertility di¤er-
entials among types.
4 Deterministic case with one type
This section considers the representative agent case with only one type. Let n (!) = n;  (!) = ;
 (!) = ; and l (!) = 1 for simplicity. In this case the resource constraint (16) reduces to:
F

K
Nt
; 1  nt;A

= ct + nt: (26)
Moreover, using (23), (24), and (26), equations (19) to (22) simplify to:
	 (N0) = 0N0;
t+1	 (Nt+1) + tNt (nt) = t+1Nt+1; (27)
t+1	0 (Nt+1)Ut+1 + t+1 = t+1FK;t+1
K
Nt+1
+ nt+1t+2; and (28)
0 (nt)
Ut+1
u0(ct)
=  + FL;t+
t+1
t
t
t
: (29)
Equation (28) is obtained from (10) after using (24), (26) and the constant returns to scale as-
sumption. Equation (29) is obtained from (22), (23), and (24).10 . The following proposition
10 In deterministic model with one type, we write  (n) as  (n; !) because everyone has the same ability.
11
provides a sharp characterization of consumption for all periods, except period 0, for the special
case  (n) = n :
Proposition 1 Assume  (n) = n , 0 <  < 1, and let am 



m
	(Nm)
(Nm)
: Then e¢ cient
consumption satises:
ct+1 =
 (ct+1)
    (ct+1)
"
t
t+1
( + FL;t)  FL;t+1   at+1Pt+1
m=0 am
Ut+1
u0(ct+1)
( P (Nt+1)   )
#
(30)
This expression is similar, and in fact, generalizes equation (7). The term tt+1 ( + FL;t)  
FL;t+1 is the net future cost of raising a child from the planners perspective. The main di¤erence
is the last term in the brackets. This term equals zero in three cases: when  P =  ;  = 0; or
t ! 1: In essence, when planners preferences di¤er from those of individuals, say because  > 0
or  P (Nt+1) >  ; then consumption is adjusted downward to free resources in order to expand
population. But those adjustments are temporary given that  <  is assumed. In the limit,
consumption becomes a sole function of the net future cost of raising a child.
4.1 Steady state
Consider the steady state situation in which N , c, U and L are constant and n = 1: The following
result holds for general functions F , u and .
Lemma 2 Steady state consumption satises:
c =
(c)
 (1)  (c) [= + (=   1)FL] : (31)
This expression generalizes (7). It shows that consumption is a function of the net costs
of raising a child: ( + FL) =   FL. The parametric restriction  (1) > (c) is needed for
consumption to be positive. An implication of this result is that immiseration and the Repugnant
Conclusion, of c = 0 and N =1, is not optimal unless the net cost of children is zero.
The resource constraint, equation (26), can be written as:
FL =
1   (k;A)
1   (c+ ) : (32)
where k = KL : Equations (31) and (32) form a system of two equations in three unknowns: c, FL
and : In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function the land share, ; is a parameter and
these two equations can be used to solve for consumption, c, and the marginal product of labor,
FL; independently of K and A, as in Section 2.
In the more general case, equation ( (25) is needed to close the system. It can be written as:
FL = (1   (k;A))F (k; 1;A) : (33)
Equations (31), (32) and (33) form a system of three equations in three unknowns: c, FL and k:
Since K does not appear in this system then the solutions for c, FL and k are independent of
the amount of land for any constant returns to scale production function. Given k, steady state
population can be solved as N = K(1 )k :
Finally, if A is a land-augmenting parameter then the land share is a function of bk = AKL : In that
case equations (32) and (33) can be written as FL =
1 (bk)
1  (c+ ) and FL =

1  
bkF bk; 1 ;
and the solutions for c, FL and bk will be independent of A. Given bk, steady state population is
given by N = AK
(1 )bk :
The following proposition summarizes these ndings.
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Proposition 3 In steady state e¢ cient consumption is independent of the amount of land while
e¢ cient population increases proportionally with the amount of land. Furthermore, if technological
progress is land augmenting then e¢ cient consumption is independent of the level of technology
while e¢ cient population increases proportionally with the level of technology.
5 Deterministic case with multiple types
Consider now the case of multiple deterministic types. Specically, suppose !t = [!; !; !:::] or
just !t = ! for short. We assume in this section  = 0: This restriction is without much loss of
generality since similar steady state results would be obtained as long as  <  (!), as shown in
the previous section. For tractability we also restrict altruism to be of the Barro-Becker form,
 (n; !) =  (!)n , but allow general formulations for u and F .
We show the following results in this section. First, if  (!) is di¤erent for di¤erent types then
their population sizes grow at di¤erent rates and in steady state only the most patient groups,
the ones with highest  (!) ; survive. This result implies that e¢ cient social classes cannot be
sustained by persistent di¤erences in rates of time preference. Lucas (2002) is able to generate
social classes using such a mechanism in a competitive equilibrium with savings constraints which
suggests that social classes are not e¢ cient, in the rst best sense, in his model.
As an alternative to Lucas (2002), we are able to generate multiple social classes using a more
standard mechanism based on heterogeneity in labor skills, l (!), and the cost of raising children,
 (!) and  (!) : This is the second main result of the section. E¢ ciency requires providing more
consumption to individuals with higher costs of raising children. Consumption also increases with
labor ability, l(!), but only if  (!) >  (!), that is, only if the time costs of raising children
are su¢ ciently high. Otherwise, the e¢ cient allocation involves the high skilled having lower
consumption.11
Third, we show that the relative population size of a type is inversely related to its relative
consumption. Therefore, the population of the poor is larger than the population of the middle
class and so on. The planner thus faces a quantity-quality trade-o¤: she can deliver certain level
of welfare by allocating number of children and/or consumption. If children are particularly costly
to raise for a certain group, then the planner optimally delivers welfare more through consumption
than through children and vice versa.
Fourth, in the deterministic steady state of this section all types have one child and therefore
steady-state welfare di¤erences among types only arise from di¤erences in consumption. As a result,
types with lower consumption are worse-o¤ than types with higher consumption. All benets from
a larger population accrue only to early members of the dynasty at the expense of later members.
5.1 Dynamics
The following lemma characterizes the evolution of e¢ cient population sizes of di¤erent types over
time.
Lemma 4 Let (!; !0) 2 
: E¢ cient population sizes satisfy:
Nt (!)
Nt (!0)
=

N0 (!)
N0 (!0)
   1  " 	 (N0 (!))
	 (N0 (!0))
 (!)
t
u0(ct (!))
 (!0)t u0(ct (!0))
# 1
1  
: (34)
We characterize the steady state next.
11This result could rationalize, for example, why high skilled women may end up having more children and low
consumption compared with an equally skilled man. Extending the model to introduce gender di¤erences is a
promising agenda for future research.
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5.2 Steady state
5.2.1 Distribution of population
Consider now a steady state in which consumption, population shares and population are constant.
This requires n (!) = 1 for all types. In that case, equation (34) simplies to:
N (!)
N (!0)
=

 (!)
 (!0)
 t
1  

N0 (!)
N0 (!0)
   1   	 (N0 (!))
	 (N0 (!0))
u0(c (!))
u0(c (!0))
 1
1  
: (35)
We can now state our next main result which is apparent from this equation.
Proposition 5 In an interior steady state: (i) Only the most patient types, the ones with the
highest  (!) ; have positive mass; (ii) The distribution of population depends on the initial dis-
tribution unless 	 (N0) = N
 
0 ; In particular, it depends on the initial distribution in the classical
utilitarian case; (iii) The relative population size of a particular type is inversely related to its
per-capita consumption.
The proof of this proposition is trivial and hence omitted. The rst part of the proposition
states that impatient types eventually disappear from the economy. Children are like an investment
for altruistic parents as they deliver a stream of future utility ows. Impatient individuals discount
future streams more heavily and therefore value children less than patient individuals do. As a
result, it is e¢ cient for the planner to provide more consumption to current individuals in exchange
for fewer future family members.12
The second part of Proposition 5 states that the steady-state distribution of population depends
on initial conditions, a result that is analogous to the dependence of the steady-state wealth
distribution on initial conditions in the neoclassical growth model (Chatterjee 1994). However, as
we see below, this dependence has more profound implications in Malthusian economics because the
steady state aggregate land-labor ratio and steady state population depends on initial conditions,
and Pareto weights, as well. This is in contrast to the neoclassical growth model where the
golden rule level of capital is independent of initial conditions and Pareto weights. E¢ ciency and
distribution are interdependent in Malthusian economies unless Pareto weights are of the form
	 (N) = N , that is, Pareto weights resemble parental weights.
The third part of Proposition 5 shows a fundamental prediction of endogenous population
models: an inverse relationship between population size and per-capita consumption. The lower
the consumption of a type the larger its share of the total population. The reason is that the
planner needs to deliver welfare by providing consumption and children to parents. Whenever the
planner chooses to use one channel then it downplays the other.
We still need to solve for consumption to fully derive the consequences of this inverse relation-
ship. For the rest of this section it is convenient to assume a specic functional form for 	 () ;
	 (N) = N p ; and restrict attention to the set of most patient types, 
p  
. That is,  (!) = 
for all ! 2 
p and    (!) for all ! 2 
: Equation (35) thus simplies to:
N (!)
N (!0)
=

N0 (!)
N0 (!0)
 p  
1  

u0(c (!))
u0(c (!0))
 1
1  
; ! 2 
p: (36)
Thus, the long term composition of the population depends on the initial distribution unless
 p =  . Moreover, the initial distribution of population tend to persist if  p >  : Classical
12This result also helps qualify a commonly held view according to which the poor are inherently more impatient,
less willing to save, and that their large families somehow reects their impatience. According to our model, if
the poor were really impatient, they would have fewer children and their type would eventually disappear from the
population.
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utilitarianism is represented by  p = 1: In this case, the steady state distribution never resembles
the initial distribution unless consumptions are equal across types which is not the case in general,
as we show below.13
The following lemma characterizes the steady state distribution of population in terms of con-
sumptions.
Lemma 6 Let g (!)  N(!)N : Then
g (!) =
N0 (!)
 p  
1  u0(c (!))1=(1  )P
!02
p N0 (!
0)
 p  
1  u0(c (!0))1=(1  )
for all ! 2 
p: (37)
The lemma is important because it provides a simple description of the steady-state distribution
of population in terms of the given initial distribution and steady-state consumptions.
5.2.2 Consumption
One can show, similarly to the rst part of Proposition 5, that only the most patient types have
positive consumption in a steady state. According to (23), for consumption to be constant t+1(!)t(!) =
t+1
t
is required. Otherwise, t+1(!)t(!) <
t+1
t
refers to a type for which consumption falls, and
vice versa. Therefore, only the types with the highest ratio t+1(!)t(!) have positive steady state
consumption. Moreover, according to (20), t+1(!)t(!) =  (1; !) =  (!) at steady state. Therefore,
t+1(!)
t(!)
is the highest for all ! 2 
p:
The following lemma provides the solution for consumptions in terms of the marginal product
of labor.
Lemma 7 E¢ cient consumption satises:
c (!) =
 (c (!)) =
 (1; !)   (c (!)) [ (!) + ( (!)  )FLl (!)] for ! 2 
p: (38)
Equation (38), analogous to (31), shows that consumption is proportional to the net nancial
cost of a child. In particular, consumption is larger for types with a higher cost of raising children,
either a higher goods cost  (!) and/or a higher time cost  (!). The relationship between skills,
l (!), and consumption is slightly more complicated. If  (!) >  then e¢ cient consumption is
higher for highly skilled individuals. But if  (!) < ; then e¢ cient consumption is actually lower
for the high skilled.
We can now state our next main result which follows from (35) and (38).
Proposition 8 Steady-state e¢ cient allocations exhibit inequality of consumptions and popula-
tions. Types with low consumption have a larger population.
Proposition 8 is important for at least three reasons. First, as is discussed by Lucas (2002),
obtaining an e¢ cient allocation with heterogeneous social classes in Malthusian economies is not
trivial yet important. Lucass solution, which relies on di¤erences in time discounting, generates
ine¢ cient social classes in presence of binding constraints. Di¤erent discount factors would still
lead to only one social group surviving at steady state in an e¢ cient allocation. Second, the
e¢ cient allocation can rationalize a distribution of social classes in which the poor are a larger
fraction of the population. Third, the proposition also states that in a world where the planner
can choose which types to reproduce or not it is not optimal to end a lineage just because it is of
13 In the utilitarian case, e¢ cient allocations are not time consistent because re-optimizing starting with an initial
steady state distribution of population results in a di¤erent steady state distribution.
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lower skill or poorer. This is in contrast to the literature that is in favor of limiting the fertility of
the poor (e.g., Chu and Koo, 1990). Only impatient types disappear from an e¢ cient allocation.
It is possible to obtain a nal solution for consumptions and relative population sizes without
knowing the marginal product of labor in the following special Barro-Becker case.
Example 9 Suppose u(c) = c= with  2 (0; 1); (n) = n ;  2 (; 1); 	 (N) = N and
 (!) = . Then
c (!) =

   
 (!)

and
N (!)
N (!0)
=

 (!0)
 (!)
 1 
1  
:
In this example, consumption is proportional to the goods cost of raising a child,  (!) ; while
the exponent 1 1  2 (1;1) controls the extent to which consumption inequality translates into
population inequality. Since the restriction  >  is needed for an interior solution, the exponent is
larger than 1. Therefore, population inequality is larger than consumption inequality. For example,
if consumption of the rich is 5 times that of the poor,
(!0)
(!) = 5, and
1 
1  = 2 then the population
of the poor is 25 times that of the rich. The planner in this example is more willing to accept a
large share of poor individuals when intergenerational substitution of consumption is particularly
low ( is low) and/or parental altruism does not decrease sharply with family size ( is high).
5.2.3 Average output
A full solution requires to nd the marginal product of labor which itself requires a solution for
the land-labor ratio. For this purpose, rewrite the steady-state resource constraint as
LF (K=L; 1;A) = N
X
!
g (!) [c (!) +  (!)] ;
Furthermore, total labor supply relative to population is expressed, at steady state, by
L
N
=
X
!
g (!) l (!) [1   (!)] : (39)
Dividing these two equations yields
F (K;L;A)
L
= F

K
L
; 1;A

=
P
! g (!) [c (!) +  (!)]P
! g (!) l (!) [1   (!)]
: (40)
The system of three set of equations, (37), (38) and (40), together with FL = (1  ) F (K;L;A)L ,
can then be used to solve for the following unknowns: g (!) ; c (!) and L.
5.2.4 Stagnation
Combining (38) and (40), and then using the denition of 
 
K
L ; A

, one obtains:
c (!) =
 (c (!)) =
 (1; !)   (c (!))

 (!) + ( (!)  )

1  

K
L
;A
 P
! g (!) [c (!) +  (!)]P
! g (!) l (!) [1   (!)]
l (!)

(41)
Equations (37) and (41) can be used to solve for c (!) and g (!) : Notice that 
 
K
L ; A

depends on
the ratio of KL . L increases to respond to an increase in K. When the technological progress is land
augmenting, the increase in A does not a¤ect 
 
K
L ; A

: Hence c (!) and g (!) are independent of
K; and they are also independent of A if the technological progress is land augmenting. Once these
two variables are solved for then (40) can be used to solve for L and (39) for N . The following
proposition summarizes these results. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3 and hence
omitted.
16
Proposition 10 Suppose  = 0;  (n; !) = n and the steady state is interior. Then: (i) in
steady state optimal consumption is independent of the amount of land and optimal population is
proportional to the amount of land; (ii) if technological progress is land augmenting then optimal
consumption is independent of the level of technology and population increases proportionally with
the level of technology; and (iii) optimal allocations depend on the initial distribution of population
unless 	(N0) = N
 
0 :
6 Stochastic case
The deterministic version of the model considered so far counterfactually predicts equal fertility
among di¤erent social groups. Malthus, however, observed that fertility rates were higher among
the poor. We now show that a version of the model with stochastic types can generate di¤erential
fertility. For tractability we once again assume  = 0 and use the Barro-Becker functional forms:
 (n; !) = n and u(c) = c=. Equation (20) can be simplied, using equation (23) and the law
of motion for population, equation (14), as:
 (nt (!
t))
nt (!t)
=
t+1
t
u0(ct (!t))
u0(ct+1 (!t+1))
: (42)
An implication of this equation is that all children within a family have the same consumption:
ct+1
 
!t; !t+1

= ct+1
 
!t

for all !t+1 2 
: (43)
The following lemma shows that optimal consumption allocations are history independent and
satisfy a formulation similar to that of (31) or (38). In particular, the consumption of a child is
proportional to the expected net costs of raising that child.
Proposition 11 Given N0
 
!0

; optimal allocations

c0
 
!0
	
!02
 ;

ct+1
 
!t+1
	1
t=0;!t+12
t+2 ;
fnt (!t)g1t=1;!t2
t+1 ;

Nt+1
 
!t+1
	1
t=0;!t+12
t+2 ; fLtg
1
t=0 ; and
n
t
t+1
o1
t=0
are solved by the fol-
lowing system:
u0(c0
 
~!0

)
u0(c0 (!0))
=
	
 
N0
 
!0

N0 (!0)
N0
 
~!0

	
 
N0
 
~!0
 ; for all !0; ~!0 2 
;
ct+1
 
!t+1

=

   
(
t
t+1
[ (!t) + FL(K;Lt;A)l (!t)t (!t)]
 FL(K;Lt+1;A)Et (l (!t+1) j!t)
)
for t  0; (44)
0
 
nt
 
!t

=  
t+1
t
u0(ct (!t))
u0(ct+1 (!t+1))
, where n0 (! 1; !0) = n0 (!0) for t  0;
(14), (15), and (16). The transversality condition for population is
lim
T!1
TNT
 
!T
  1
cT
 
!T
 1

 
!T ; !0
1  NT+1  !T+1
 (!T+1; !T )
 
 (!T ) +
F2(K;LT ;A)T (!T ) l (!T )
!
= 0
Notice that according to the proposition ct+1
 
!t+1

= ct+1 (!t) and nt (!t) = nt (!t 1; !t) so
that e¢ cient consumption is not history dependent and e¢ cient fertility depends only on parents
own ability and grandparentsability. Similarly, substituting (44) into (42), it follows that nt (!t) =
nt (!t 1; !t) so that the number of children only depends on parental and grand-parental types.
6.1 Steady state
Consider now stationary steady state allocations in which nt (!t 1; !t) = n (!t 1; !t) ; ct (!t 1) =
c (!t 1), Nt (!t) = N (!t 1; !t) and Nt = N . Let Qt  tt+1 be the planners shadow gross return
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and with a little bit abuse of notation let g (!t 1; !t)  N(!t 1;!t)Nt be the population share with
recent history (!t 1; !t). The following lemma summarizes the system of equations and unknowns
describing stationary steady state.
Lemma 12 Steady state allocations, c (!) ; n (! 1; !) ; g (! 1; !) ; Q; L and N are solved from
the following systems of equations:
c (!) =
Q
    [ (!) + FLl (!) (!)  FLE [l (!+1) j!] =Q] ; (45)
n (! 1; !) =

Q
u0(c (!))
u0(c (! 1))
 1
1  
; (46)
g (!; !+1) =
X
! 1
n (! 1; !) (!+1; !) g (! 1; !) ; (47)
X
! 1
X
!
g (! 1; !)n (! 1; !t) = 1; (48)
F

K
L
; 1;A

=
N
L
X
! 1
X
!
g (! 1; !) [c (! 1) +  (!)n (! 1; !)] ; (49)
L
N
=
X
! 1
X
!
g (! 1; !) l (!) (1   (!)n (! 1; !)) : (50)
where FL =
 
1    KL ; AF  KL ; 1;A :
Equation (45) shows the consumption of an individual whose parent is of type !: Consump-
tion is positively associated with parental costs of raising children and parental skills, and it is
negatively associated with the expected skills of the child. Equation (46) shows fertility di¤eren-
tials among di¤erent types. Optimal fertility depends on parental and grandparents types. Given
grandparents types, parents with low consumption have more children than parents with high
consumption. Also, given parental types, consumption rich grandparents have more grandchildren
than consumption poor grandparents. Equation (48), which in principle serves to solve Q, restricts
fertility to be one on average. Equations (49) and (50) are resource constraints of goods and labor.
The next proposition shows that the stagnation property still holds in the stochastic case.
Proposition 13 Suppose the steady-state is interior. Then, steady state optimal consumption is
independent of the amount of land and optimal population increases proportionally with the amount
of land. Furthermore, if technological progress is land augmenting then optimal consumption is
independent of the level of technology and population increases proportionally with the level of
technology.
To summarize, in addition to stagnation, the key properties of the stochastic steady state are
di¤erential fertility and heterogeneous social groups. Moreover, all types, or social groups, are
represented in a steady state even if their initial population is zero as long as  is non-reducible.
7 Decentralization
This section extends Section 2 to consider stochastic signals. We show that when  = 0; the social
planners problem can be decentralized by a competitive market economy with a xed amount of
land. The basic environment is the same with the social planners problem. Parents are altruistic
toward children in the form of Barro-Becker. We follow previous notations except for adding
a superscript c to allocations of consumption, fertility, population labor and land to represent
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competitive equilibrium allocations. Let kct (!
t) denotes the amount of land each adult living in
period t is endowed with when his family history is !t 2 
t+1: It can be regarded as the bequest
from parents and can be traded at the price pt: Land can also be rented at the rental rate rt:
Parents are allowed to sign a contingent contract based on childrens type !t+1, that is buying or
selling land for the next generation depending on each ones realization of ability. Let qt (!t+1; !t)
be the time t price of one unit of land contingent on the time t + 1s realization of childs ability
to be !t+1 and the time ts realization to be !t: People work in a competitive labor market. Let
wt (!t) be the wage of type !t at time t.
Initial parents maximize their own dynastys welfare:
max
fct(!t);nt(!t);kt+1(!t+1)g1t=0;!t2
t+1
E
24 1X
t=0
X
!t2
t+1
t 1Y
j=0

 
nj
 
!j

; !j

u
 
ct
 
!t
35
Households are subject to the following constraints:
ct
 
!t

+  (!t)nt
 
!t

+ nt
 
!t
 X
!t+1
qt (!t+1; !t) kt+1
 
!t+1

(51)
 wt (!t)
 
1   (!t)nt
 
!t

+ (rt + pt) kt
 
!t

for !t 2 
t+1; t  0;
where initial population and land holding

N0
 
!0

; k0
 
!0
	
!02
 is given. Assume  (n; !) = n
 
and u(c) = c=.
Firms hire labor on a competitive labor market, and people rent land to rms on a competi-
tive land market. The competitive equilibrium of this problem is characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 14 Given prices

rt; fwt (!t)g!t2
t+1
	1
t=0
, and initial level of capital and popula-
tion

k0
 
!0

; N0
 
!0
	
!02
, equilibrium allocations

cc0
 
!0
	
!02
 ;

cct+1
 
!t+1
	1
t=0;!t+12
t+2 ;
fnct (!t)g1t=0;!t2
t+1 ;

kct+1
 
!t+1

; N ct+1
 
!t+1
	1
t=0;!t+12
t+2 ; and fLctg
1
t=0 are solved by the fol-
lowing system of equations
cct+1
 
!t+1

=

   

rt+1 + pt+1
pt
[ (!t) + wt (!t) (!t)]  Et [wt+1 (!t+1)]

(52)
for t  0;
 (nct (!
t))
nct (!
t)
=
pt
rt+1 + pt+1
u0(cct (!
t))
u0(cct+1 (!t+1))
for t  0; (53)
(51), (14), (15), and the non-Ponzi game condition
lim
T!1
T
N cT
 
!T
  1
ccT
 
!T
 1
( (!T ) +  (!T )wT (!T ))
 (!T ; !0)
  1
 (!T+1; !T )
N cT+1
 
!T+1

= 0
where equilibrium prices

rt; fwt (!t)g!t2

	1
t=0
are given by rt = FK (K;Lct ;A) and wt (!t) =
FL (K;L
c
t ;A) l (!t) : fptg1t=0 is determined by land market equilibrium, K =
P
!t2
t+1 N
c
t (!
t) kct (!
t)
for all t  0: fqt (!t+1; !t)g1t=0 satises qt (!t+1; !t) = pt (!t+1; !t) for all t  0.
Rewrite (53) and iterate, we obtain
pt =
 (nct (!
t))
nct (!
t)
u0(cct+1
 
!t+1

)
u0(cct (!t))
(rt+1 + pt+1) (54)
Iterate (54), we obtain
pt = Et
24 1X
j=0
 
jY
k=0

 
nct+k
 
!t+k

nct+k (!
t+k)
!
u0(cct+j+1
 
!t+j+1

)
u0(cct (!t))
35 rt+j+1
+ lim
T!1
Et
" 1Y
k=0

 
nct+k
 
!t+k

nct+k (!
t+k)
!
u0(cct+T+1
 
!t+T+1

)
u0(cct (!t))
#
pt+T+1:
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To guarantee boundedness of the dynastys welfare, the second term is 0, so that
pt = Et
24 1X
j=0
 
jY
k=0

 
nct+k
 
!t+k

nct+k (!
t+k)
!
u0(cct+j+1
 
!t+j+1

)
u0(cct (!t))
35 rt+j+1:
Price is the present value of rents discounted by a rate that depends on the standard discount
factor in  as well as the fertility rates.
Corollary 15 The competitive equilibrium consumption of every individual depends on parental
type but not on ones own type, e.g. cct+1
 
!t+1

= cct+1 (!t) : As a result, fertility depends both on
parentsand grandparentstypes, e.g. nct (!
t) = nct (!t 1; !t)
14 :
The proof of this corollary is straightforward according to equations of (52) and (53), and it is
omitted. Next, we show that the social planners problem can be decentralized by a competitive
equilibrium with an initial land distribution.
Proposition 16 Given initial population

N0
 
!0
	
!02
 and the social planners altruism on
people living in the rst period,

	
 
N
 
!0
	
!02
 ; there exits a competitive equilibrium with an
initial land distribution

k0
 
!0
	
!02
 and equilibrium prices satisfying
rt+1+pt+1
pt
= tt+1
that
decentralizes the social planners problem.
8 Concluding comments
This article lls a gap in our understanding of e¢ ciency in economies characterized by endogenous
fertility and xed resources. We propose and implement a novel methodology that allow us to
provide a sharp and more general characterization of socially optimal allocations in these envi-
ronments. We nd that e¢ cient allocations under endogenous fertility di¤er sharply from those
derived under exogenous fertility. This nding underscores the importance of better understanding
social optima when population is endogenous and responds to economic incentives.
The pre-industrial world was to a large extent Malthusian. As documented by Ashraf and
Galor (2011), periods characterized by improvements in technology or in the availability of land
eventually lead to a larger but not richer population. This is remarkable given the diversity
of political, social, religious, geographical, cultural, and economic environments they considered,
some arguably more advanced than others. We nd that stagnation, inequality, high population
of the poor and di¤erential fertility can naturally arise as an optimal social choice. Our ndings
could shed light on why the Malthusian "trap" was so pervasive in pre-industrial societies. We
also show that is not the irrational animal spirit of human beings, as suggested by Malthus, what
ultimately explains the stagnation. Stagnation can be the result of an optimal choice between the
quality and quantity of life in the presence of limited natural resources.
Finally, we expect that our methodology will further facilitate the integration of demographics
and macroeconomics.
14n0 (! 1; !0) = n0 (!0)
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Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1. In the deterministic case, the rst order conditions with respect to nt;
Nt+1; Ut; and ct are
tn (nt)Ut+1 = t + tlt + t+1; (55)
t+1	0 (Nt+1)Ut+1 + t+1l [1  t+1nt+1] + t+1 (56)
= t+1 [ct+1 + nt+1] + nt+1t+2
t+1Nt+1 = 
t+1	 (Nt+1) + tNt (nt) (57)
tu
0 (ct) = t
Substitute out t+1 and t+2 of (56) using (55), and then use (24) and (23) to substitute out t+1
and t; respectively, we obtain
t+1	0 (Nt+1)Ut+1 + tn (nt)Ut+1 (58)
= t+1u
0(ct+1)

ct+1   FL;t+1l + t
t+1
( + FL;tlt)

+t+1
nt+1n (nt+1)
 (nt+1)
(Ut+1   u (ct+1))
Iterate (57), we can get
t+1 = 
t+1 	 (Nt+1)
Nt+1
+
 (nt)
nt

t
	 (Nt)
Nt
+
t 1 (nt 1)
nt 1

=
t+1X
m=1
m
	 (Nm)
Nm
tY
j=m
 (nj)
nj
+
tY
j=0
 (nj)
nj
0
=
t+1X
m=0
m
	 (Nm)
Nm
tY
j=m
 (nj)
nj
Given that the altruism function takes Barro-Beckers form  (n) = n ;
t+1 = 
t+1N  1t+1
t+1X
m=0
(=)
m 	 (Nm)
N m
Plug this result into (58),
t+1	0 (Nt+1)Ut+1 + t+1N
  1
t+1
ntn (nt)
 (nt)
Ut+1
tX
m=0
(=)
m 	 (Nm)
N m
= t+1N  1t+1
t+1X
m=0
(=)
m 	 (Nm)
N m
u0(ct+1)

ct+1   FL;t+1l + t
t+1
( + FL;tlt)

+t+1N  1t+1
 
t+1X
m=0
(=)
m 	 (Nm)
N m
!
nt+1n (nt+1)
 (nt+1)
Ut+1
 t+1N  1t+1
 
t+1X
m=0
(=)
m 	 (Nm)
N m
!
nt+1n (nt+1)
 (nt+1)
u (ct+1)
Under the assumed form of  () ;  = ntn(nt)(nt) =
nt+1n(nt+1)
(nt+1)
, we can simplify terms and solve
consumption as (1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a steady state situation in which N and c are constant. In that
case n = 1 and (27) can be written as t+1=t =  +
t+1	(N)
Nt
 : Under Assumption 1, the
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ratio 
t+1	(N)
Nt
goes to zero in the limit. It is easy to show that the Lagrange multipliers grow at
constant rate at steady state. To see this, rst look at (23) and (24), which implies that t; t;
and t grow at the same rate at steady state. Using the steady state version of (22) we can see
that
t+1
t
=
t+1n (1)U
tn (1)U
=
t+1
t
t +
t+1
t
tl+
t+2
t+1
t+1
t + tl+ t+1
so
t+1
t
t +
t+1
t
tl+
t+1
t
t+1 =
t+1
t
t +
t+1
t
tl+
t+2
t+1
t+1
Since t; t; and t grow at the same rate at steady state, this equation can be reduced to
t+1
t
=
t+2
t+1
Then t grows at the same rate with t; t; and t at the steady state, which implies that
t
t
is a
constant at steady state. Hence
t+1
t
is a constant by (29), and so are other Lagrange parameters.
Therefore t+1=t = t+1=t = t+1=t = t+1=t = : We can solve
t
t
as
t
t
=
FK
K
N
1   =
F
 
K
N ; 1  ;A
  FL (1  )
1   : (59)
On the other hand, equation (17) simplies in steady state to U = u(c)1  : Therefore, (29) can be
written, using the results obtained for U , tt ,
t+1
t
and the denitions of  and 15 as:
 (1) c=(c) = (1  )  + (  )FL + F

K
N
; 1  ;A

: (60)
This equation together with the resource constraint (26) can be used to solve consumption as
c =
 (c)
 (1)   (c)

t
t+1
( + FL)  FL

:
(23) and (27) imply
t+1
t
=  at steady state, then we obtain (31).
Proof of Proposition 3. For the rst part of this proposition A is given. Then c, MPL, and KL
are fully determined by the three equations (31), (32) and (33). Hence consumption is independent
of the amount of land while e¢ cient population increases proportionally with the amount of land.
For the second part when F
 
K
N ; 1  ;A

= F^
 
AK
N ; 1  

; F (K;L;A) = F^ (AK;L) ;then


K
L
;A

=
AF^1 (AK;L)K
F^ (AK;L)
=
F^1 (AK=L; 1)
F^ (AK=L; 1)
AK
L
= ^

AK
L

c =
(c)=
   (c) [ + (  ) MPL] (61)
MPL =
1  ^  AKL 
1   (c+ ) (62)
where
MPL =

1  ^

AK
L

F^

AK
L
; 1

: (63)
Then c; MPL and AKL are solved by (61), (62) and (63), which are all independent of A:
Proof of Lemma 4. Let st (!)  t (!)Nt (!) : Equation (20), given that  = 0 is assumed, can
then be written as st+1 (!) = st (!)  (nt (!)), in particular,
s1 (!) = s0 (!)  (n0 (!)) ; s2 (!) = s0 (!)
1Y
i=0
 (ni (!)) :
15 In the deterministic case with one type, we write  (1; !) and  (c (!)) as  (1) and  (c), respectively.
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More generally, st (!) = s0 (!)
t 1Y
i=0
 (ni (!)) : Recall that  (n) =  (!)n is assumed in part IV;
it follows that:
st (!) = s0 (!) (!)
t
 
t 1Y
i=0
ni (!)
! 
= 0 (!) (N0 (!))
1  
 (!)
t
(Nt (!))
 
: (64)
Now (23) can be written as tNt (!) = st (!)u
0(ct (!)): Therefore
Nt (!)
Nt (!0)
=
st (!)u
0(ct (!))
st (!0)u0(ct (!0))
:
Substituting (64) into this equation gives
Nt (!)
Nt (!0)
=
0 (!) (N0 (!))
1  
 (!)
t
(Nt (!))
 
u0(ct (!))
0 (!0) (N0 (!0))
1  
 (!0)t (Nt (!0))
 
u0(ct (!0))
:
Finally, use (19) to substitute 0 (!) and solve for
Nt(!)
Nt(!0)
to obtain (34).
Proof of Lemma 6. According to equation (36), and let !0 = !0,
N (!) = N (!0)

N0 (!)
N0 (!0)
 p  
1  u0(c (!))1=(1  )
u0(c (!0))1=(1  )
:
Adding N (!) over !;
N =
X
!
N (!) =
N (!0)
N0 (!0)
 p  
1  u0(c (!0))1=(1  )
X
!
N0 (!)
 p  
1  u0(c (!))1=(1  )
and therefore
g (!0) =
N (!0)
N
=
N0 (!0)
 p  
1  u0(c (!0))1=(1  )P
! N0 (!)
 p  
1  u0(c (!))1=(1  )
for all !0 2 
p:
Proof of Lemma 7. Rewrite (21) using (24) and evaluate it at the steady state:
1 =
t+1
t+1 (!)
[c (!) +  (!)  FLl (!) (1   (!))] +
t+2 (!)
t+1 (!)
:
Since
t+2(!)
t+1(!)
is constant in steady state then
t+1
t+1(!)
needs to be constant for this equation to
hold, which means that
t+1(!)
t(!)
=
t+1
t
= : The last equality holds by (23) and (27). Therefore,
the previous equation can be written as:
t (!)
t
=
1
1   [c (!) +  (!)  FLl (!) (1   (!))] : (65)
This expression states that the value of an immigrant in terms of goods, t(!)t ; is the net present
value of the net cost. In steady state U(c (!)) = u(c(!))1  : Use this result, (23) and (24) to rewrite
(22) as:
0 (1)
1  
u(c (!))
u0(c (!))
=  (!) + FLl (!) (!) + 
t (!)
t
: (66)
One can combine (65) and (66) to solve for consumption as
c (!) =
 (c (!))
0 (1)   (c (!)) [ (!) + ( (!)  )FLl (!)] :
Using (n) = n provides the result.
25
Proof of Proposition 11. When  = 0, the rst order conditions with respect to
U0
 
!0

; Ut+1
 
!t+1

; Nt+1
 
!t+1

; nt
 
!t

; ct
 
!t

; Lt
	
t0
are (19), (20), (22), (23), (21), and (24) respectively while setting  = 0 in (20) and (21). Use (23)
the rst order condition with respect to nt (!t) becomes
nt
 
!t

:
t
u0(ct (!t))
1
 
nt
 
!t

; !

EtUt+1
 
!t+1

=
X
!t+1j!t
t+1
 
!t+1

 (!t+1; !t) + t (!t) + tl (!t)t (!t)
Get 0
 
!0

from (23) and plug it into (19),
	
 
N0
 
!0

N0 (!0)
=
0
u0(c0 (!0))
By assumption

N0
 
!0
	
!02
 are given, we can use this equality to express consumption of c0
 
~!0

for all ~!0 2 
 as a function of c0
 
!0

, which is
u0(c0
 
~!0

)
u0(c0 (!0))
=
	
 
N0
 
!0

N0 (!0)
N0
 
~!0

	
 
N0
 
~!0
 ; for all !0; ~!0 2 
:
This set of equations and the rst periods resource constraint can be used to solve for

c0
 
!0
	
!02

in the system. Use the rst order condition with respect to nt (!t) and Lt to obtain
EtUt+1
 
!t+1

=
u0(ct (!t))
tn (nt (!
t) ; !)
" P
!t+1j!t t+1
 
!t+1

 (!t+1; !t)
+t (!t) + tF2(K;Lt;A)l (!t)t (!t)
#
for all t  0. Plug the rst order condition with respect to ct (!t) into that with respect to
Ut+1
 
!t+1

;
u0(ct (!t))
u0(ct+1 (!t+1))
=
t
t+1
 (nt (!
t) ; !t)
nt (!t)
(67)
so nt (!t) is independent of !t+1 and EtUt+1
 
!t+1

can be expressed as
EtUt+1
 
!t+1

(68)
=
u0(ct+1
 
!t+1

)
t+1
1
 
" P
!t+1j!t t+1
 
!t+1

 (!t+1; !t)
+t (!t) + tF2(K;Lt;A)l (!t)t (!t)
#
for all t  0. Move the rst order condition with respect to Nt+1
 
!t+1

by one period backward,X
!t+1j!t
t+1
 
!t+1

 (!t+1; !t) + t (!t) + tF2(K;Lt;A)l (!t)t (!t)
=
1
nt (!t)

t
 
!t

+ tF2(K;Lt;A)l (!t)  tct
 
!t

for all t  1;
so
EtUt+1
 
!t+1

=
u0(ct (!t))
t
1
n (nt (!t) ; !t)nt (!t)

t
 
!t

+ tF2(K;Lt;A)l (!t)  tct
 
!t

for all t  1, Plug it into the value function for all t  1;
Ut
 
!t

= u0(ct
 
!t

)

ct
 
!t
 1

+
1
t
1
 

t
 
!t

+ tF2(K;Lt;A)l (!t)  tct
 
!t

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Forward one period and take expectations for all t  0;
EtUt+1
 
!t+1

= u0(ct+1
 
!t+1

)
2664
ct+1
 
!t+1

1

+ 1t+1
1
 
"
Ett+1
 
!t+1

+ t+1F2(K;Lt+1;A)Etl (!t+1)
 t+1ct+1
 
!t+1
 #
3775
Use this equation and (68) we get
1
t+1
1
 
[t (!t) + tF2(K;Lt;A)l (!t)t (!t)]
= ct+1
 
!t+1
1

  1
 

+
1
 
F2(K;Lt+1;A)Etl (!t+1)
Hence, ct+1
 
!t+1

= ct+1 (!t) and the optimal consumption for all t  0 is (44). Use it and (67),
fertility can be solved as follows:
n (nt (!t 1; !t)) =  
t+1
t
u0(ct (!t))
u0(ct+1 (!t+1))
for t  0:
where n0 (! 1; !0) = n0 (!0) : When  (n) = n as in the Barro and Becker (1988) and (1989),
nt
 
!t

= nt (!t 1; !t) =


t
t+1
u0 (ct+1 (!t))
u0(ct (!t 1))
 1
1  
:
(14), (15), and (16) are the constraints of the social planners problem and need to be satised.
Next let us solve the transversality condition about population. In this paper capital is land, which
is xed at the amount K: Given Nt (!t), the value of Nt+1
 
!t+1

to the value function is
t
 
!t

Nt
 
!t

0
 
nt
 
!t
 EtUt+1  !t+1
Nt (!t) (!t+1j!t)   t
 (!T )
 (!t+1j!t)   t
T (!T ) l (!T )
 (!t+1j!t)
= t
 
!t

0
 
nt
 
!t
 EtUt+1  !t+1
 (!t+1j!t)   t
 (!T )
 (!t+1j!t)   t
FL(K;LT ;A)T (!T ) l (!T )
 (!t+1j!t)
The transversality condition becomes
lim
T!1
T
 (!t+1j!t)
"
t (!
t) 0 (nt (!t))EtUt+1
 
!t+1

 t ( (!T ) + FL(K;LT ;A)T (!T ) l (!T ))
#
NT+1
 
!T+1

= 0:
Use (20) to express t (!t) and iterate,
t
 
!t

= t 1
 
!t 1
   nt 1  !t 1
nt 1 (!t 1)
=   
= 0
 
!0
 Nt (!t)
N0 (!0) (!t; !0)
  1
t
Plug it and (19) into (23), and use the specied functional forms,
t = 0
 
!0
 Nt (!t)
N0 (!0) (!t; !0)
  1
tu0

Ct (!
t)
Nt (!t)

=
 
 
N0
 
!0

N0 (!0)
t
Nt (!
t)
  
(N0 (!0) (!t; !0))
  1Ct
 
!t
 1
lim
t!1 t
 
!t

0
 
nt
 
!t
 EtUt+1  !t+1
 (!t+1j!t) Nt+1
 
!t+1

= lim
t!1
t 
 
N0
 
!0

N0 (!0)

Nt (!
t)
N0 (!0) (!t; !0)
  1
0
 
nt
 
!t
 EtUt+1  !t+1
 (!t+1j!t)
= 0:
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The transversality condition becomes
lim
T!1
T
NT
 
!T
  
CT
 
!T
 1
 (!T ; !0)
  1
 (!T+1; !T )
( (!T ) + T (!T )F2(K;LT ;A)l (!T ))NT+1
 
!T+1

= 0:
Write consumption into per capita term, we obtain the transversality condition in Proposition 10.
Proof of Corollary 12. At steady state (44) becomes (45). (46) can be obtained using (42)
and the specied functional forms. The law of motion of population (14) becomes (47). Total
population is constant and therefore average fertility is equal to 1 as stated by (48). Equations
(49) and (50) are steady state versions of (16) and (15).
Proof of Proposition 13. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3 and uses guess and
verify. A longer direct proof is also possible. Consider the solution for an initial amount of land,
say K0. Let K0N0 and L0 be the steady state solution of land-population ratio and labor for K0.
Then consider a di¤erent amount of land, say K1. Guess that the solution for the new steady
state is identical to the initial solution except for two changes: N1 = K1=K0N0 so that the land-labor
ratio is unchanged, and L1 = N1 L0N0 so that the labor-population ratio is unchanged. Notice that
under the proposed solution the marginal product of labor is unchanged too. One can then use
Corollary 12 to verify that under the proposed guess, the solutions for consumption, fertility, the
distribution of population and Q that solve for K0 also solve for K1. Similarly for land-augmenting
technological progress, guess that population responds to keep AKL unchanged for di¤erent levels
of A, while labor responds to keep the ratio LA unchanged, and nothing else changes. One veries
that the proposed solution satises all equations in Corollary 12.
Proof of Proposition 14. Recall that   u
0(ct+1(!t+1))ct+1(!t+1)
u(ct+1(!t+1))
and   nt(!
t)0(nt(!t))
(nt(!t))
: Let
us solve the problem by taking rst order conditions:
kt
 
!t

:
t 2Y
j=0

 
nj
 
!j

u0(ct 1
 
!t 1

)nt 1
 
!t 1

qt 1 (!t; !t 1)
=
t 1Y
j=0

 
nj
 
!j

u0(ct
 
!t

) (!t; !t 1) (rt + pt)
for all t > 0. Simplify it,
kt
 
!t

: u0(ct 1
 
!t 1

) =

 
nt 1
 
!t 1

nt 1 (!t 1)
u0(ct
 
!t

)
rt + pt
pt 1
for all t > 0: (69)
so ct+1
 
!t+1

depends on !t but not on !t+1 for all t  0, it can be written as (53).
nt
 
!t

:
t 1Y
j=0

 
nj
 
!j

u0(ct
 
!t

)
24 (!t) + X
!t+1
qt (!t+1; !t) kt+1
 
!t+1

+ wt (!t) (!t)
35
= Et
1X
m=t+1
m 1Y
j=0

 
nj
 
!j

u (cm (!
m))
0 (nt (!t))
 (nt (!t))
for all t  0. Cancel
t 1Y
j=0

 
nj
 
!j

;
nt
 
!t

: u0(ct
 
!t

)
24 (!t) + X
!t+1
qt (!t+1; !t) kt+1
 
!t+1

+ wt (!t) (!t)
35
= 0
 
nt
 
!t

Et
1X
m=t+1
m 1Y
j=t+1

 
nj
 
!j

u (cm (!
m))
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where
tY
j=t+1

 
nj
 
!j

= 1. Use rst order condition with respect to kt+1
 
!t+1

and forward by
one period to substitute out u0(ct (!t));
 (nt (!
t))u0(ct+1
 
!t+1

)
nt (!t)
rt+1 + pt+1
pt
24  (!t) + P!t+1qt (!t+1; !t) kt+1  !t+1
+wt (!t) (!t)
35 (70)
= 0
 
nt
 
!t

Et
1X
m=t+1
m 1Y
j=t+1

 
nj
 
!j

u (cm (!
m))
where
Et
1X
m=t+1
m 1Y
j=t+1

 
nj
 
!j

u (cm (!
m)) (71)
= Et
24u  ct+1  !t+1+   nt+1  !t+1 1X
m=t+2
m 1Y
j=t+2

 
nj
 
!j

u (cm (!
m))
35
Forward (70) by one period,

 
nt+1
 
!t+1

nt+1 (!t+1)
u0(ct+2
 
!t+2

)
rt+2 + pt+2
pt+1
2664
 (!t+1)
+
P
!t+2
qt+1 (!t+2; !t+1) kt+2
 
!t+2

+wt+1 (!t+1) (!t+1)
3775(72)
= 0
 
nt+1
 
!t+1

Et+1
1X
m=t+2
m 1Y
j=t+2

 
nj
 
!j

u (cm (!
m)) for t  0.
By (69), (70), (71), (72) and the (t+ 1)-period budget constraint, we have
u0(ct+1
 
!t+1

)
rt+1 + pt+1
pt
24 (!t) + X
!t+1
qt (!t+1; !t) kt+1
 
!t+1

+ wt (!t) (!t)
35
=  u
 
ct+1
 
!t+1

+ u0
 
ct+1
 
!t+1

Et
"
wt+1 (!t+1) + (rt+1 + pt+1) kt+1
 
!t+1

 ct+1
 
!t+1
 #
By the actuarially fair price of q (!t+1; !t), we are able to cancel the term associated with
Et

(rt+1 + pt+1) kt+1
 
!t+1

and solve ct+1
 
!t+1

as (52) for all t  0. nt (!t) is given by (53) where n0 (! 1; !0) = n0 (!0) :
Notice that ct+1
 
!t+1

depends on !t for all t; and hence nt (!t) depends on !t and !t 1 for
t  1 while n0
 
!0

depends on !0: Given prices fwt (!t)g1t=0;!t2
t+1 , frtg1t=0,

k0
 
!0
	
!02
, and
N0
 
!0
	
!02
, in equilibrium

c0
 
!0
	
!02
 ;

ct+1
 
!t+1
	1
t=0;!t+12
t+2 ; fnt (!t)g
1
t=0;!t 1;!t2
t+1 ;
fkt (!t)g1t=1;!t2
t+1 ;

Nt+1
 
!t+1
	1
t=0;!t+12
t+2 ; and fLtg
1
t=0 are solved by the system of equa-
tions consisting of (52), (53), (51), (14) and (15) where n0 (! 1; !0) = n0 (!0). Next let us solve
for the transversality condition associated with population. Rewrite the households problem as:
max
fNt+1;Kt+1g
1X
t=0
t
X
!tj!0
 
1
N0 (!0)
 
 (!tj!0)  1
!
Nt
 
!t
   Ct (!t)

where
Ct
 
!t

= ct
 
!t

Nt
 
!t

= (rt + pt)Kt
 
!t
  ( (!t) +  (!t)wt (!t)) Nt+1  !t+1
 (!t+1j!t)
+wt (!t)Nt
 
!t
  ptKt+1   !t
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the transversality condition of population is
lim
T!1
T
Nt (!
t)
  
 (!tj!0)  1
Ct
 
!t
 1
( (!t) +  (!t)wt (!t))
NT+1
 
!T+1

 (!t+1j!t) = 0
Assume there is a representative rm in the competitive market who is a price taker. The equilib-
rium prices are rt = F1 (K;Lt;A) and wt (!t) = F2 (K;Lt;A) l (!t) : fptg1t=0 is determined by land
market equilibrium: the supply and demand of land equalizes, that is K =
P
!t Nt (!
t) kt (!
t) for
all t  0:
Proof of Proposition 16. Under the condition rt+1+pt+1pt =
t
t+1
and the equilibrium price
given in Proposition 13, the equivalence of consumption and fertility can be easily seen from the
equivalence between the two systems in Proposition 10 and 13. The equivalence of the transversality
condition is also obvious. In particular, there must exists an initial land distribution

k0
 
!0
	
!02

that leads to the same competitive equilibrium level of consumption

c0
 
!0
	
!02
 as that in the
social planners problem given other allocations are simultaneously determined by their respective
system. For the rest of the proof it su¢ ces to show that the budget constraints (51) in the
competitive equilibrium is consistent with the resource constraint (16) in the social planners
problem. Adding up individualsbudget constraint over di¤erent ability history !t and weight it
by its population Nt (!t) ;X
!t
Nt
 
!t

ct
 
!t

+
X
!t
Nt
 
!t

 (!t)nt
 
!t

+
X
!t
Nt
 
!t

nt
 
!t
 X
!t+1
qt (!t+1; !t) kt+1
 
!t+1

=
X
!t
Nt
 
!t

wt (!t)
 
1   (!t)nt
 
!t

+
X
!t
Nt
 
!t

(rt + pt) kt
 
!t

Since X
!t
Nt
 
!t

nt
 
!t
 X
!t+1
qt (!t+1; !t) kt+1
 
!t+1

=
X
!t
X
!t+1
ptNt
 
!t

nt
 
!t

 (!t+1; !t) kt+1
 
!t+1

=
X
!t
X
!t+1
ptNt+1
 
!t+1

kt+1
 
!t+1

= ptK;
and X
!t
Nt
 
!t

wt (!t)
 
1   (!t)nt
 
!t

=
X
!t
Nt
 
!t

F2 (K;Lt;A) lt (!t)
 
1   (!t)nt
 
!t

= F2 (K;Lt;A)Lt;
the budget constraint can be written asX
!t
Nt
 
!t
 
ct
 
!t

+  (!t)nt
 
!t

= F2 (K;Lt;A)Lt + rtK = F2 (K;Lt;A)Lt + F1 (K;Lt;A)K
= F (K;Lt;A) :
Therefore X
!t
Nt
 
!t
 
ct
 
!t

+  (!t)nt
 
!t

= F (K;Lt;A) :
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It indicates that households budget constraints satisfy the resource constraint faced by the social
planner.
A.2. Deterministic case with one type.
A.2.1.Case   :
Lemma 17 Assume  > 0 and the production function F (; ) satises Inada condition and
lim
L!1
FKL (K;L) = 0:
(i) If  > , a steady state satises the following equations:
N	0 (N)
	 (N)
   
(1  ) (   1)
=
 (c)
c

0 (1)
c
 (c)
1
1      + F

K
N
; 1  ;A


   1  
(1  )
1  

:
F

K
N
; 1  ;A

= c+  (73)
and
t+1
t
=
t+1
t
=
t+1
t
= :
(ii) If  = , the steady state does not exist.
Proof. (i) When  > 0 and N is nite, one can rst show that t+1=t = : Otherwise if
t+1=t > ; then in the limit, according to (27),
t+1=t =  +
t+1	 (N)
Nt
(74)
then t+1=t =  < , a contradiction. If t+1=t < , then the right hand side of (74) explodes
which also leads to a contradiction. (23) then implies that the growth rate of t is the same as
that of t, which is .
Furthermore, (28) at steady state simplies to:
	0 (N)U   t+1
t+1
FK
K
N
=
t+1
t+1

t+2
t+1
  1

:
The left hand side of this equality is constant in steady state since the growth rate of  is : Then
for the right hand side to converge to a constant we have the following three possibilities: t grows
at a rate smaller than , t grows at the rate , and t keeps constant over time, e.g.
t+2
t+1
= 1.
Consider the rst possibility when t grows at a rate smaller than , then
	0 (N)U =
t+1
t+1
FK
K
N
(75)
Express (27) and (23) at steady state,
t =
t+1	 (N)
N (   )
t = tu
0(c) =
t+1	 (N)
N (   ) u
0 (c) (76)
Plug it into (75) multiplied by N	(N) and use U =
u(c)
1  at steady state,
N	0 (N)
	 (N)
c =
 (1  )
     (c)FK
K
N
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By the constant return to scale assumption and the denition of  above, it can be written as
N	0 (N)
	 (N)
c
 (c)
=
 (1  )
    
F (K;L;A)
N
(77)
which together with (73) and L = N (1  ) can be used to solve (c;N). Given that the growth
rate of t is smaller than that of t according to (76), we express (29) at steady state as
0 (1)
c
 (c)
1
1   =  + (1  )
F (K;L;A)
N

1   (78)
Use 0 (1) =   and (73) we solve consumption as
c =
 (c) 1  
h
1 + (1  ) 1 
i

1   (c) 1  (1  ) 1 
:
(c;N) solved from (77) and (73) does not satisfy (78) in general. Therefore, in the case of  bigger
than ; the steady state with each multiplier growing at a constant rate, in particular t growing
at a constant rate smaller than , is not the optimal solution except for a knife-edge condition in
which (c;N) satises (73), (77), and (78) simultaneously.
Next consider the second possibility when t grows at the rate of . Express (27), (29) and
(23) at steady state, respectively, as
t+1
Nt
	 (N) +  (1) =  ) t = 
t+1	 (N)
N (   ) ; (79)
t =
1

t

0 (1)
U
u0(c)
     FL

; (80)
and
t = tu
0(c) =
t+1	 (N)
N (   ) u
0 (c) : (81)
Plug (80) into the steady state formula of (28), we get
t+1
t+1
	0 (N)U =

0 (1) Uu0(c)      FL
FK
K
N
+    1
Use (79), (80) and (81) we get
N (   )
	 (N)
	0 (N)U = u0 (c)FK
K
N
+
   1

t+1
t
u0 (c)

0 (1)
U
u0(c)
     FL

We have shown that t grows at the rate ; then
N
	 (N)
	0 (N)
1
1  
=

   
u0 (c)
u (c)
FK
K
N
+
   1
   
u0 (c)
u (c)

0 (1)
U
u0(c)
     FL

=
   1
   
 (c)
c

0 (1)
U
u0(c)
     FL+ 
   1FK
K
N

Note that
FL =

1  
1  

F
N
FK
K
N
= 
F
N
:
So the above equality becomes
N	0 (N)
	 (N)
1
1  
=
   1
   
 (c)
c

0 (1) c
1
 (c)
1
1      + F

K
N
; 1  ;A


   1  
(1  )
1  

:
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which together with (73) solves (c;N) :The second case gives the solution.
For the third possibility
t+1
t
= 1 at steady state, which together with
t+1
t
=  < 1 contradicts
with equation (29).
(ii) If  = , (27) becomes
t+1
t
=
t+1
t
	 (N)
N
+   :
If limt!1
t+1
t
= ; then limt!1 
t+1
t
	(N)
N > 0 and
t+1
t
converges to a number strictly bigger
than  and a contradiction arises since N is a nite number when  > 0. If limt!1
t+1
t
> ,
then limt!1
t+1
t
= limt!1 
t+1
t
	(N)
N = 0, a contradiction. Hence steady state with Lagrange
multipliers growing at constant rate over time does not exist in this case.
A.2.2. Stability of the steady state
To get some insights about the stability of the steady state, in this section we also focus on
the deterministic case with one type and  = 0. In that case the social planner cares about future
generations to the extent that the initial generation does. Furthermore, assume no time costs of
raising children,  = 0, Barro-Beckers functional forms  (n) = n , u (c) = c

 , a Cobb-Douglas
production function F (K;Nt;A) = AKN
1 
t ; and N0 = 1. The restriction  >  is required for
concavity.
Initial parents utility is then given by
U0 = u (c0) + n
 
0 U1 =
1X
t=0
t
Yt 1
j=0
n j u (ct) =
1X
t=0
tN t
1

ct :
The following is the social planners problem:
max
fCt;Nt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tN t
1

ct subject to ctNt = F (K;Lt;A) Nt+1:
Substitute the budget constraint into the objective function,
max
fCt;Nt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tN t
1


F (K;Nt;A) Nt+1
Nt

The optimal choice of population in period t is
N  t C
 1
t  = N
  
t+1 C
 1
t+1

 

  

AKN t+1   
   

Nt+2
Nt+1

where Ct = ctNt is the aggregate consumption of all people of generation t: It is convenient to
dene the variable Xt  N
  
1 
t Ct, a mix between aggregate consumption and a factor that depends
on population. Then the dynamic system can be described by the following two equations:
Xt = N
  
1 
t

AKN1 t  Nt+1


Xt+1
Xt
1 
 = 

 

  

AKN t+1   
   

Nt+2
Nt+1

The rst equation is the resource constraint and the second is the optimality condition for popu-
lation. Steady state population, N, can be solved as
AKN  =
    + =
    : (82)
Next we take a rst-order Taylor expansion of this system around the steady state to analyze its
stability. It is determined by the system of equations (83):
W
"
dNt+2
N
dXt+1
X
#
= G
"
dNt+1
N
dXt
X
#
(83)
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where
W =
"
N
(1  )=(1 )
X 1
    1  
#
and
G =
24 (    ) = (1  ) + (1  )1 + N(1  )=(1 )X  0
(1  )       1  
35 :
The following proposition provides the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which the steady
state is saddle path stable.
Proposition 18 The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for saddle path stability of the steady
state are
(2  )
  
 (1  2 + (1  )) + (1  ) 2 (1  )
1=   (1  ) >  (1  2)  2 (1   )
and
1

( (1  )  1 +  ) 6= (1  )    

:
Proof. Equation (83) can be written as:"
dNt+2
N
dXt+1
X
#
= D
"
dNt+1
N
dXt
X
#
:
where
D W 1G
=
"
N
(1  )=(1 )
X 1
    1  
# 1 24   1  + (1  )1 + N(1  )=(1 )X  0
(1  )       1  
35
=
1
d
2664
0@     + (1  ) (1  )1 + N(1  )=(1 )X 
+  (1  )   
1A    1
     ((1   ) = (1  )  )  N
(1  )=(1 )
X 
N(1  )=(1 )
X (1  )
3775
with d = N
(1  )=(1 )
X (1  )       : Let 1 and 2 denote the eigenvalues of the matrix D.
Assume, without loss of generality, that 1 > 2: They are solved by
1 =
tr (D) +
q
tr (D)
2   4 det (D)
2
2 =
tr (D) 
q
tr (D)
2   4 det (D)
2
where det (D) and tr (D) can be solved as
d2 det (D) =
8>>><>>>:
24     + (1  ) (1  )1 + N(1  )=(1 )X 
+  (1  )   
35 N(1  )=(1 )X (1  )
  (1  )
h
    ((1   ) = (1  )  ) + N
(1  )=(1 )
X
i
9>>>=>>>;
d  tr (D) =
8<:     + (1  ) (1  )

1 + N
(1  )=(1 )
X

+ 
  (1  )    + N
(1  )=(1 )
X (1  )
9=;
For saddle-path stability either j1j < 1 and j2j > 1 or j1j > 1 and j2j < 1: Since 1 > 2 by
assumption this condition can be divided into two cases: (i) 1 > 1 and  1 < 2 < 1 and (ii)
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2 <  1 and  1 < 1 < 1. Let us rst consider case (i) which can be reduced to 1   tr (D) <
 det (D) < 1 + tr (D), and then to
(1 D11) (1 D22) < D12D21 < (1 +D11) (1 +D22) ;
where Dij refers to the (i; j) element of matrix D. The condition in case (ii) which can be reduced
to tr (D) + 1 <  det (D) <  tr (D) + 1, and then to
(1 +D11) (1 +D22) < D12D21 < (1 D11) (1 D22) :
Now let us derive terms in these conditions.
d2D12D21
=

    

((1   ) = (1  )  )  N
(1  )=(1 )
X

(   1)
At steady state,
N(1  )=(1 )
X
=
 =   
1=   (1  ) (84)
d (1 D11) =    (1 + ) +  (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
     

d (1 D22) =     

d2 (1 D11) (1 D22)
=     


   1   +  (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
     


Use the above result, derive the condition (1 D11) (1 D22) < D12D21 in case (i). It holds if
and only if
 (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
> 
   

: (85)
Substitute out N
(1  )=(1 )
X using (84) it becomes
1

( 1 +  +  (1  )) <    

(1  ) : (86)
D12D21 < (1 +D11) (1 +D22) holds if and only if 
2 (2  )  (1  ) N(1  )=(1 )X
  (2  )    + 2 (1   ) +   2 (1  )
!
 (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
     


> 0
When (85) holds true, this inequality holds if and only if
2 (2  )  (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
  (2  )   

> 2 (1  )  2 (1   )  :
Substitute out N
(1  )=(1 )
X using (84),
(2  )
  
 (1  2 + (1  )) + (1  ) 2 (1  )
1=   (1  ) >  (1  2)  2 (1   ) (87)
Hence the condition for case (i) is (86) and (87). In the same way we can derive that the condition
for case (ii) is the following two inequalities
1

( (1  )  1 +  ) > (1  )    

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and (87). Summarize case (i) and case (ii), the su¢ cient and necessary condition for saddle path
stability is (87) and
1

( (1  )  1 +  ) 6= (1  )    

:
Given  <  , the Barro-Beckers assumption for the concavity of the problem, this condition
holds for most sets of parameters. The second condition holds except for a wide range of parameters.
In particular, a nice su¢ cient condition guarantees saddle path stability is  < 12 and  (1  2) 
2 (1   ) : We summarize it in the following Corollary.
Corollary 19 A su¢ cient condition for saddle path stability of the steady state are  < 12 and
 (1  2) < 2 (1   ) :
Under this condition, the left hand side 1 ( (1  )  1 +  ) is positive while its right hand
side is non-positive.
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